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Abstract
This paper investigates the relative role of religion in trust networks and proposes a model of
the interaction between material payoffs and norm-dependent utility, permitting cooperative
equilibria. Four influences on decision-making - believing in religion, stereotyping, belonging
to a group, and priming - are tested in the laboratory, using an adapted trust game. The
experimental design builds on a classic trust game but reveals characteristics of Responders
and Proposers in multiple rounds, better aligning with societal interactions where both par-
ties condition actions and reactions on available information. Religious individuals are both
more trusting and trusted; stereotyped trust is a rational strategy. A Cambridge University
sample provides unique collegiate affiliation confirming that dense secular networks equally,
but less intensely, promote trust.
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1. Introduction
From hunter-gatherer societies bound by kinship, human beings have organised them-
selves into large societies characterised by anonymous but cooperative interactions. This
paper investigates the role of religion in “norms and institutions that sustain fairness in
ephemeral exchanges” (Henrich et al. 2010, p.1480). Religious creeds have long been used
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to instil pro-social and trusting behaviours, acting as a coordination device in heterogeneous
populations of genetically unrelated individuals. In testament of its significance, the bible
instructs ‘Trust thy neighbour’ and the US dollar implores ‘In God We Trust’. The ex-
ploitation of a mutually-reinforcing belief system by both the religious and the secular acts
as a behavioural heuristic to govern interactions between strangers. Common knowledge of
religious doctrines creates a social network where mutual trust is lent (Putnam 1993), tran-
scending the absence of kinship and permitting cooperation in societal interactions (Henrich
et al. 2010). Religion makes cooperation a winning strategy. The aim of this paper is to
test the effectiveness of religion and alternative group affiliations in generating cooperation.
It utilises a model of the interaction between material payoffs and norm-dependent util-
ity, where pressure to conform to group norms permits cooperative equilibria. Adherence
to accepted moral creeds (Believing) vis-a`-vis religious or secular group affiliation (Belong-
ing) can apply this internal pressure. Expectations of a partner’s characteristic gameplay
(Stereotyping) and increased salience of religious thought (Priming) can influence behaviour
externally. Understanding the social significance of religion requires such scrutiny between
religious values and groups (Hoffman 2013).
This study’s design departs from existing literature in a number of ways. In the labora-
tory experiment participants play a modified version of the Berg et al. (1995) trust game
with repeated rounds revealing different information on partner type e.g. your partner is
anonymous, your partner is religious or your partner has the same religious affiliation as
you. This within-subject approach identifies the different responses of each individual to
different partners. The design reveals the relative importance of believing, belonging and
stereotyping devices for decisions made under uncertainty. The battery of treatment rounds
better isolates: (1) positive and negative stereotyping conditioned on revealed information
and (2) in-group versus out-group behaviours. This experimental design permits comment
not only on how beliefs govern behaviour of religious individuals but also how expectations
of stereotypical religious behaviour imbue trust. Additionally, unlike previous experiments,
trustworthiness (the Responder’s full strategy set) is conditioned by partner characteristics
to capture pure prosociality unmarred by expected reciprocity. Results are evaluated with
uni-dimensional and multi-dimensional models derived from independent factor analysis,
mitigating bias from self-reported religiosity. The factor rotation and regression techniques
require less restrictive assumptions than previous methods used in the literature. Finally,
and crucially, religion is viewed as a coordination device but through a comparative lens
to secular affiliation. The belonging channel is isolated using unique collegiate affiliation
to mimic in-group effects of religion. Cambridge University comprises 31 autonomous col-
leges responsible for provision of accommodation, food, and pastoral care. The strength
of intra-collegiate friendship is demonstrated succinctly in the network diagram presented
in Figure 1. The cluster of tight-knit community networks align interests in a way other
secular affiliation, namely political or environmental alliance, cannot. Uncoupling the role
of religious networks from social networks in this way has not previously been attempted.
Four predictions arise based on existing literature and the proposed model. Firstly,
a believing hypothesis, individuals with stronger religious beliefs always display more
prosociality and trust towards partners. Secondly, a stereotyping hypothesis, individuals
2
use expectations of their partners’ characteristics to determine trust. Thirdly, a belong-
ing hypothesis, partners of the same norm-group display more mutual trust. Finally, a
priming hypothesis, manipulating individuals for salience of religious thought increases
prosociality.
The experimental results support the first three of these predictions. Religion is predic-
tive of gameplay in a trust game - through own religious characteristics and stereotyping
of these characteristics by others. Religious individuals are significantly more trusting with
all partners, especially those from their own religion evidencing in-group favouritism. All
individuals, secular and religious, are more trusting of religious over anonymous partners.
Greater trust is a rational strategy given the trustworthiness of religious participants. Group
belonging drives these results: partners of the same group display greater trust and other-
regarding behaviour. Trust is consolidated when group affiliation is common knowledge.
Individuals are more trustworthy towards in-group partners with higher return proportions.
Religious and secular in-group effects strengthen trust networks; believing and belonging
conjointly provide cooperative infrastructure between strangers. Priming produced insignif-
icant results, perhaps due to the weakness of the instrument and decision-fatigue biases.
Compared to previous experimental research (Hoffman 2013), these findings confirm re-
ligion’s function as a social identifier but additionally identify the significance of religiosity
for individual behaviour. Religion promotes cooperation towards other specific adherents,
conditioned on environment of interaction (Scobie 1975). Given this, the strength of this
experiment rests on the informational revelation methodology to mimic the societal com-
plexities of religion amongst other group affiliations but in a strategic laboratory game.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature, Section 3
outlines the model and theoretical considerations. Section 4 explains the experimental pro-
cedure. Section 5 describes the statistical methods applied. Section 6 and 7 present the key
and robustness results. Section 8 offers a discussion of strengths and limitations. Section 9
concludes.
2. Literature Review
Iannaccone (1998) broadly defines religion as “any shared set of beliefs, activities and in-
stitutions premised upon faith in supernatural forces” (p.1431). To delineate the dimensions
of religion is theoretically and empirically challenging. The coevolution of religious institu-
tions with societies introduces problematic endogeneity. Advancing Weber’s (1958) initial
identification of desirable protestant qualities, cross-country studies (Barro and McCleary
2003; Putnam 1993; La Porta et al. 1997) suggest religion is conducive to economic growth
but if culture is indeed ‘sticky’, as Rubin and Karaja (2017) propose, such studies do not
evince causal effects. Religion is pervasive, but also heterogeneous. Existing literature dis-
plays considerable Judeo-Christian bias, and despite participation from nine major religions,
this study suffers from similar over-representation of a few. To demonstrate religion’s causal
impact, only a “genuine experiment will suffice” (Freeman 1986, p.371). Experimentally
testing religiosity and trust allows observation of behaviour whilst controlling confounding
characteristics of participants.
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Figure 1: Network diagram of within and between collegiate friendships. Each node is a college. Node
size scaled by proportion of total friends in college. Edges are friendships between individuals. Edge width
gives number of individuals with that specific link. Links looping back to their origin represent intra-college
friendships. Colour for print
4
Trust prevents opportunistic behaviour and promotes economic growth (Knack and
Keefer 1997). Arrow (1972) argues “much of the economic backwardness in the world can
be explained by a lack of mutual confidence” (p.357). This study uses a modified version of
Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe’s (1995) trust game, widely used to elicit interpersonal trust
and trustworthiness, where a Proposer decides how much money to send to a Responder, who
decides how much of the tripled amount received to return. In subgame perfect equilibrium,
the Proposer imbues no trust with expectation of none returned. Contrastingly, placing full
trust in a partner educes a Pareto-optimal solution, characterising a classic social dilemma.
Using trust games, Tan (2006) finds payment to anonymous partners is influenced posi-
tively by religious belief but negatively by religious participation, while Tan and Vogel (2008)
show trust increases with trustee’s religiosity. These studies benefit from multidimensional
measures of religion advised by De Jong et al. (1976). In contrast, Anderson et al. (2010)
find self-identified religious affiliation irrelevant to trusting behaviours. In a field experi-
ment, Ruﬄe and Sosis (2003, 2006) examine religion’s role promoting in-group cooperation.
Jewish men belonging to the same kibbutz were more generous and trusting to their own,
demonstrating religious participation reinforces beneficial collective favouritism.
Placing trust is risky. With uncertainty over partner type, beliefs are founded on stereo-
typical institutions which influence behaviour (Bowles and Gintis 2002, Balliet and Van
Lange 2013). Religious doctrine instructs interpersonal trust to ‘do unto others as you
would have others do unto you’, acting as ‘cooperative infrastructure’ (Binmore and Das-
gupta 1986), governing beliefs into another’s trustworthiness. Experimental studies show
expectations of reciprocity determine trust (Rabin 1993, Fehr and Schmidt 2003). Beliefs
about how beliefs affect behaviour (second order beliefs) are key to facilitating cooperation;
players cooperate conditional on expected cooperation in return (Fischbacher et al. 2001).
Orbell et al. (1992) shows religiosity is a marker of cooperation, so in absence of repeated
actions and reputational concerns, it serves as a mechanism to Bayesian update expected
strategies attributed to certain populations.
2.1. The Channels of Religion
Although religious behaviours are not rigidly dichotomous, religion has been broadly
divided by believing and belonging. Belief orthodoxy, adherence to accepted creeds, in-
duces moral other-regarding behaviours. The captivation of religious minds by the morally
concerned supernatural (‘Big Gods’, Norenzayan 2013) promoted costly devout behaviours
derived from moral instruction and divine reputation which reach beyond expectations of
earthly reciprocity. Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) propose individuals allocate time and money
to secular and religious activities, maximising utility in this life and the afterlife. This ‘belief
only’ approach is limited, ignoring a wide range of payoffs to religious activity beyond divine
consideration.
Believing in religion is a concomitant channel to belonging to that religion. Iannac-
cone (1998) assigns religion as a ‘club good’, considering belonging from a rational choice
perspective, costly rituals exclude free-riders from in-group benefits. In support of club mod-
els, Adam Smith (1776) analysed the clergy and congregation as corporations committed
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to mutually-beneficial production. Indeed, Durkheim (1915) regarded religion as funda-
mentally collaborative. Many experimental studies suggest group belonging has a greater
influence on behaviour than belief orthodoxy.
This dichotomous distinction is an unsatisfactory simplification and there remain gaps
in the literature. Firstly, religion comprises beliefs but how they influence behaviour is un-
clear. To isolate the dominant mechanisms, this paper reveals different types of religious
information. Secondly, while in-group and out-group behaviours are considered (Ruﬄe and
Sosis 2006), little distinction is made between secular and religious group effects; under am-
biguous definitions of religion, a bowling club is equivalent to a congregation (Iannaccone
1998). Darwin (1874) first argued secular institutions have scope to promote other-regarding
behaviour over self-interest, while Becker and Dhingra (2001) argue “social networks, rather
than beliefs” (p.329) enforce mutually-beneficial behaviours. Religions are simply particu-
larly effective trust networks (Levy and Razin 2012). Freuhwirth et al. (2018) do begin to
test the substitutability of “school clubs/sport participation or friendships for religiosity”
(p.1) but the literature lacks comment on the interplay between religion and other networks
more broadly. This study uses unique collegiate affiliation as a homophily cluster to better
proxy non-religious but dense communities with their own belonging channels.
Rituals (e.g., daily prayer) inherently keep religion top of mind. Availability bias of
religious thought has been experimentally tested by investigating how choices differ after
religious identity is randomly made salient with an unscrambling sentence task. Shariff and
Norenzayan (2007) and Liu et al. (2013) find primed subjects act more trustingly, but Choi
and Fisher (2010) fail to replicate results with the same priming instrument. Differences in
priming effect on both religious and secular individuals are also investigated in this paper.
This work complements previous work by investigating the operative channel by which
religion affects behaviour but goes further addressing how beliefs about this mechanism affect
one-shot interactions. Moreover, it extends existing literature on belonging, demonstrating
strong secular group affiliation is weakly substitutable for religious affiliation. The key
proposition is that ascription to the same shared values binds individuals together and
religion is only one such coordination device.
3. Theory
In this section, norm-dependent utility is outlined and contrasted with the standard game
theory solution of a trust game with, and without, certainty over partner characteristics.
3.1. Norm-Dependent Utility
A rich set of models exist to explain behaviour where agents regard their own and oth-
ers’ payoffs. Gagnon (2014) demonstrates religion can foster trust by introducing a threat
of costly punishment, while Ng and Wang (2015) emphasise how a centralised institution
changes dynamics of reciprocity between trustor and trustee. For one-shot interactions,
Dasgupta’s (2011) interpretation best applies where a disposition to obey social norms,
defined as “shared understandings about actions that are obligatory, permitted, or forbid-
den”(Ostrom 2000, p.143), introduces a trade-off between self-interest and group conformity.
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Cooperation is determined by internal and external expectations of group appropriate ac-
tions. Combining these ideas motivates the proposition that first-order beliefs (an intrinsic
desire to play a certain strategy) and second-order beliefs (beliefs about type-contingent
strategies) govern strategic behaviour. Following the model in Kimbrough et al. (2016), it is
assumed behavioural influences of group affiliation are captured by a parameter measuring
strength of individual norm-dependent preferences. The greater someone feels pressure to
adhere, the further they deviate from the predicted self-interested strategies of traditional
game theory.
3.2. Model
An extensive game allows for two sequential stages of the trust game and application
of SPNE analysis. Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of players and aT their actions. Define H
as the finite set of histories where h = (a1, a2, ..., aT ) of length T . Define Z as the set of
terminal histories, and S the set of pure strategies.
The standard material payoff function pii : Z → R converts terminal histories Z to
numeric values. As in Krupka and Weber (2013), there is a ‘social appropriateness’ of each
action, where function g maps actions into a social appropriateness score, g : A → [−1, 1]
where -1(/1) is ‘very socially inappropriate(/appropriate)’. It is assumed group norms are
common knowledge.
Define norm-dependent utility of player i:
Ui(z) = pii(z) + φi
T∑
i=1
g(ati(z)) (1)
Where φi is norm-pressure: how much selfishness is discounted for group norm adherence.
3.3. Trust Game
Proposer chooses to send x ∈ [0, 6] to Responder and keeps remainder (6−x). Responder
receives 2x and chooses y ∈ [0, 2x] to return to Proposer. Figure 2a presents the extensive
form.
3.3.1. Standard Solution
Assuming linear utility and selfishness:
UP (x, y) = (6− x) + y (2)
UR(x, y) = 2x− y (3)
Backward induction gives the SPNE. Responder chooses:
y∗(x) = max
y
UR(x, y) =⇒ y∗ = 0 (4)
Responder returns nothing to maximise utility. Knowing this, Proposer sends nothing:
x∗ = max
x∈[0,6]
[UP (x, y)|y∗ = 0] =⇒ x∗ = 0 (5)
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Figure 2: Extensive Form with certainty (panel a) and with uncertainty (panel b).
Equilibrium strategies yield zero-cooperation {SP : x = 0;SR : y = 0 ∀ x ∈ [0, 6]}, with
payoffs (6,0) to Proposer and Responder respectively. No trust is lent.
3.3.2. Norm-Dependent Solution
For Pareto-optimality, a social planner instructs Proposer to send everything x = 6 and
Responder to return half (y = 6). To avoid loss of generality, assume Responder norm is a
fraction ωR ∈ [0, 1] such that y = ωRx; higher offers are met with higher returns. The upper
bound represents the equitable solution where Responder returns y = 6, keeping the same
amount for himself. Responder’s norm is adjusted to preserve the [0,1] interval so highest
disutility from deviant action is φR .
Norm-Utility of Proposer and Responder:
UP (x, y, φP ) = (6− x) + y − φPg(6− x) (6)
UR(x, y, φR) = 2x− y − φRg
(∣∣∣ y − ωRx
(2− ωR)x
∣∣∣) (7)
Using backwards induction, Responder chooses:
y∗(x, φR) = max
y∈[0,2x]
2x− y − φRg
(∣∣∣ y − ωRx
(2− ωR)x
∣∣∣) (8)
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As φR → 0, y∗ → 0, i.e. as norm intensity dissipates, the amount returned decreases and
selfishness dominates. As φR →∞, y∗ → ωRx i.e. the norm-appropriate return.
Proposer conditionally chooses:
x∗(φP , φR, y) = max
x∈[0,6]
(6− x) + y∗(x, φR)− φPg(6− x) (9)
Higher φP and φR encourage Proposer to send everything (x
∗ = 6).
3.3.3. Uncertainty over φi
Adopting Harsanyi’s (1967) transformation from an incomplete to imperfect information
game, Nature plays first to decide type (Figure 2b). Responder’s strategy is unchanged, the
game ends with their decision. Information on φP is irrelevant besides conditioning when
Responder is more trustworthy and norm-sensitive if their partner belongs to the same norm-
group. In this case, responses to revealed Proposer characteristics is captured by higher φR
or by different norm-appropriateness of certain actions.
Placing trust is a risky investment. Proposer’s strategy must be sequentially rational
given beliefs of Responder’s norm-disposition µ(φR) which are updated on available infor-
mation (e.g., revealed Responder characteristics). Optimal x thus solves:
x∗ = max
x∈[0,6]
(6− x)− φPg(6− x) + E[y∗(x, φR)|µ(φR)] (10)
Proposer’s payoff can be increasing in x if φR is high, allowing higher expected y
∗. There
is minimal difference between Proposer types because the optimal amount sent depends on
beliefs about φR; both secular and religious players condition trust on available informa-
tion. Contrastingly, high φR Responders will always be more trustworthy, returning larger
proportions than lower φR counterparts.
3.4. Theoretical Predictions
Drawing on the literature and model forms four predictions:
Prediction 1. Believing: Individuals with stronger beliefs in divine reputation have more
moral concern, displaying more trust and altruism in all behaviour. φP and φR are always
higher and self-interest weaker as both Proposer and Responder.
Prediction 2. Stereotyping: Proposers use expectations of partners’ φR to place trust.
Information indicating Responder belongs to a population with higher φR endorses more
trust even from secular Proposers with lower φP .
Prediction 3. Belonging: Proposers and Responders matched with in-group partners con-
form more closely to the group norm, with higher φP , φR and dominating g. A magnified
effect arises when belonging to the same group is common knowledge. In expectation, re-
ligious and collegiate in-group effects are stronger than weaker secular commonalities of
environmental or political views. Collegiate affiliation isolates a belonging pressure without
the contaminating effect of believing.
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Prediction 4. Priming: Proposers treated with salience of religious thought have higher
φP . It is possible secular individuals are encouraged to mimic religious altruism but a greater
effect is expected for primed religious individuals by bringing group pressures to front of mind.
4. Experimental Method
This section outlines the experimental design features, explained in comparison and
contrast to previous studies. The experiment was conducted at the Judge Business School
Laboratory in December 2017 testing 80 subjects in nine computerised sessions, each 40
minutes.
4.1. Trust and Trustworthiness
All subjects play both Responder and Proposer in a modified version of Berg et al.’s
(1995) trust game. Proposer (the “truster”) decides how many pounds to send Responder
(the “trustee”). For each pound sent, Responder receives two before deciding how many
to return to Proposer. Appendix A presents experimental instructions. As Tan and Vo-
gel (2008) advise, neutral language avoids framing effects (“Participant A” not “Proposer”;
“pass” not “invest”). To preserve anonymity and participants’ belief in live matches, e.g.
someone in their college, the participants were told matching occurred across two experi-
mental locations. No communication between participants, screened workstations and the
experimenter vacating the room protected privacy of decision-making. While double-blind
procedures are ideal (Hoffman et al. 1996), this was not feasible. Payments of a fixed and
variable component were determined via a branching algorithm (coded in VBA). A random
winning round was chosen for the Proposer who was then matched to the nearest neigh-
bour Responder with the stated characteristic in the selected round. The recorded response
strategy of this Responder in this round determined the variable payment.
4.1.1. Proposer Round
Proposers started with £6 in each of 13 rounds presented in a randomised sequence to
prevent order dependence (round description presented in the Code Book, Appendix B).
Each round reveals information on partner characteristics. In the first round ‘an anonymous
partner’ tests baseline trust under complete uncertainty. In rounds 2-9 first-order informa-
tion is revealed about the partner’s affiliations. Religiosity is more comprehensively tested
compared to existing literature by separating ‘your partner has told us they are religious’
from ‘has the same religious affiliation’. Separation identifies favouritism versus discrimi-
nation found by Fershtman et al. (2005) between in-group or out-group partners. Secular
group affiliation was tested through collegiate ties revealing ‘your partner is at the same
college’. Distractor rounds ‘environmental friendliness’ and ‘political inclination’ provided
alternative secular affiliation and mitigated the Hawthorne bias from presupposition religion
is the test subject. In rounds 10-12, second-order information is revealed: characteristics of
Responder and what Responder knows about Proposer. For example, ‘your partner is at
the same college and knows you are also at this college’ which is termed ‘Matched College’.
Lastly, the participant is told they’re playing a machine which tests differences between
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treatment of human partners who value cooperation and reciprocity versus an inanimate
computer. Expected machine aversion requires fixing this last to avoid a low framing point
biasing earlier rounds.
4.1.2. Responder Round
Responders provided a full strategy set (Selten 1967) of returns for each hypothetical
amount given by Proposer, a method preferred to live feedback which confounds the rela-
tionship of religiosity and trust by introducing situational dependence or spite. There were
five rounds of Proposer information: anonymous, religious, same college, environmentally
friendly and politically inclined. Each round had six decisions; to avoid decision-fatigue
biasing later rounds, distractors were last.
4.1.3. Discussion of Experimental Design
The experimental design builds on Tan and Vogel (2008) but explores the natural exten-
sion to reveal information not just about Responders but also Proposers. While previously
untested, this aligns more closely with societal interactions where both parties condition
responses on available information and stereotypes. The literature standard initial endow-
ment is £10 which permits increased variation and incentive power. However, this experi-
ment endowed Proposers with £6 which mitigates decision-fatigue by reducing the number
of Responder decisions from 60 to 36 but still permits the egalitarian option of sending half
the original endowment.
Considering further advantages, Proposers believe they are matched with partners who
possess certain characteristics and are later informed about the set of common knowledge.
The literature alludes to, but does not specifically test, use of shared characteristics as coor-
dination devices. The illusion of being live-matched with partners is non-credible unless: (1)
Responder decisions are pre-recorded and (2) preliminary information about participants’
college, religiosity, environmental friendliness and political inclination is collected. Conse-
quently, the experiment began with five short survey questions, following which Responder’s
strategy set was recorded. To further enhance credibility, an automatic-delay loading screen
was programmed instructing participants to wait while matched by the computer.
4.2. Priming
The design employs a priming instrument developed by psychologists Srull and Wyer
(1979) and borrowed by economists (Liu et al. 2013; Choi and Fisher 2012; Shariff and
Norenzayan 2007). The task involved unscrambling sentences with the treatment including
words of a religious nature [Tables 1-2]. Participants were given five lists of five words
but must form sentences using only four. They then played a subset of Proposer rounds
with some distractor questions dropped for time and fatigue considerations. The instrument
offers implicit and subtle means to activate religious thinking, circumventing problems of
forthright measures e.g. reading passages.
4.3. Risk Aversion
Risk aversion is common among high religiosity individuals (Hoffman and Miller 1995),
analogous to Pascal’s Wager that irreligion is strategically risky with little gain if God doesn’t
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Words Unscrambled Sentence
1 Meal Divine Was Fork The The Meal Was Divine
2 Act The Sacred Wet Is The Act Is Sacred
3 The Gasoline Are Blessed Peacemakers Blessed Are The Peacemakers
4 Righteous His Dancer Soul Was His Soul Was Righteous
5 Helpful We Trust God In In God We Trust
Table 1: Treatment Sentences
Words Unscrambled Sentence
1 The Flew She Sunburnt Kite She Flew The Kite
2 Quickly Arrived Vividly Food The The Food Arrived Quickly
3 Happened Folk Smile It Because Smile Because It Happened
4 Ate The Pies Website Men The Men Ate Pies
5 Sick Became Mountain Cat The The Cat Became Sick
Table 2: Control Sentences
exist but considerable disutility if He does. To elicit risk aversion, participants made nine
binary choices in a Holt-Laury (2002) multiple price list. Their methodology is used to
calculate a coefficient of relative risk aversion under iso-elastic utility:
U(x) =
x1−σ
1− σ (11)
To avoid restricting preferences, a single switching point was not enforced. With hindsight,
disallowing multiple switches could be beneficial since six individuals recorded this behaviour
indicating they did not fully understand the task.
4.4. Survey
The order of questions was randomised, mitigating decision-fatigue bias. Phraseology of
questions was inclusive of all major religions to avoid the Judeo-Christian tilt of existing
literature. Standardised questions of religion and trust were taken from the World Values
Survey. Demographic characteristics do explain some variation, despite providing limited
explanation of religious behaviour. Gender, for example, has been shown to be a determinant
of trust with greater female generosity (Buchan and Croson 1999). Appendix B presents the
code book and summary statistics for all variables.
In total, just under half (46.4%) of participants affiliated with a religion but all partici-
pants were questioned on religious practices. Religiosity questions were split into believing
and belonging. Belief considers personal dimensions, e.g. prayer frequency and belief in
god or afterlife. Stereotyped characteristics are extracted by asking are religious individu-
als more trustworthy, 46% of participants agreed. Belonging considers service attendance,
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participation in and financial contribution to religious organisations. Comparable secular
belonging records participation in societies or sports teams, attendance at social events,
meals in hall or services in college chapels.
5. Statistical Method
This section presents an overview of factor analysis and its application to two religiosity
models.
5.1. Factor Analysis
The common factor model states an observed variable is caused by unobserved factors
plus an error term (Anderson 1963). Factor analysis is preferred for constructing a measure
of religiosity as a condensed statement of relationships between the complex set of survey
variables. Each isolated component captures a necessary but insufficient component of reli-
giosity. Factor analysis has the added benefits of reducing numerous explanatory variables,
mitigating multicolinearity and avoiding ‘desirability bias’ (Hoffman 2013) from self-reported
religiosity.
5.1.1. Uni-Dimensional Religiosity Model
All aspects have high positive loadings on the primary factor in the uni-dimensional
model [Table 3] which is interpreted as ‘General Religiosity’. Personal prayer and religious
service attendance load strongly on this measure. Estimated specific variances indicate
individuals’ religiosity score on each unique measure varies substantially beyond variation
explained by the common factor1. A p-value of 0.000 offers confirmation to refit the model
with two common factors.
5.1.2. Multi-Dimensional Religiosity Model
Using Screeplot analysis (Cattell 1966), two factors are retained in the multi-factor model.
Factor rotation aims to achieve ‘simple structure’ (Thurstone 1947) which is more inter-
pretable. Previous factor analysis on religiosity variables (Tan 2006; Tan and Vogel 2008)
assumes factor orthogonality, implicit in the use of the Varimax rotation method. Orthog-
onality implies the extracted factors - belief, ritual, experience - are uncorrelated. This
assumption is viewed as inappropriate and, as such, an oblique method is instead used
which performs non-rigid rotation of the axes allowing for interrelated factors. The Promax
algorithm was considered but Generalised Procrustes Analysis with a specified target matrix
gave better ‘simple structure’. Figure 3 overlays unrotated, rotated Varimax and Procrustes
loadings. This orientation clarifies the superiority of Procrustes to literature-used Varimax.
Using the standard cut-off of 0.35, Table 3 presents the two emergent factors, interpreted as
‘Believing’ and ‘Belonging’.
1Specific variance of 1 indicates no common factor component, and 0 indicates variable entirely deter-
mined by common factor
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Uni-Factor Loading Multi-Factor Loadings
Variable GENERAL REL Specific Var BELONGING BELIEVING
1 Pray 0.8815 0.2229 0.4946 0.4713
2 God Belief 0.8409 0.2929 0.9349
3 Afterlife Belief 0.7598 0.4227 0.5522
4 Holy Books 0.8511 0.2757 0.8207
5 Attend 0.8735 0.2369 0.8033
6 Funds 0.7172 0.4856 0.4163 0.3850
7 Religious Upbringing 0.6608 0.5633 0.3967
8 Grandparent Religiosity 0.4663 0.7825 0.3993
9 Religious Participation 0.8644 0.2527 0.9008
Table 3: Interpreted Factor Loadings in Two Religiosity Models
Figure 3: Overlay of Factor Analysis Methods. Colour in print, but possible reproduction in greyscale
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5.2. Multivariate Analysis
Trust represented by the amount sent by Proposer (Xi) depends on: (1) own religiosity
(Reli), (2) a vector of personal characteristics (Z
′
i) including sex and coefficient of risk aver-
sion (CRRA), (3) round effects (Roundi) i.e. differential treatment of partners, and (4) inter-
actions between own religiosity and round capturing in-group effects. There are unobserved
individual fixed effects across rounds, and a round-variant idiosyncratic error. Roundi is
proposed as a function of expected reciprocity given available information E[yi|Round = R]
and Proposer’s norm and norm-pressure for that Responder type [(φP , g)|φR].
Xi = β0 + β1Reli + γ
′Z ′i + λ
′Roundi + β2(Roundi ×Reli) + µi + εiR (12)
A similar framework for trustworthiness defines Responder’s return proportion (Yi) but
differs in two dimensions since the game ends subsequently: CRRA is not included as a
control and Roundi does not depend on expected reciprocity, only on altruism [φR, g]. The
strategy method removes situational dependence so amount received is not included as a
regressor.
Yi = δ0 + δ1Reli + ω
′Z ′i + ψ
′Roundi + δ2(Roundi ×Reli) + µi + εiR (13)
Regression equation (12) is estimated using an ordered probit model assuming trust is
a latent continuous variable underlying the ordinal discrete responses observed, regarded a
more suitable assumption than literature standards of OLS or Tobit estimation. Fixed-effects
estimation removes round-invariant individual heterogeneity and order effects but reduces
variation since Reli is constant. By also adding individual and session-level random-effects,
a multilevel mixed-effects specification best accounts for individual heterogeneity and non-
independence from within-subject design (Moeltner et al. 2008).
Figure 4 shows return proportions are distributed somewhat unusually. An ordered
probit requires fewer categories and despite use of OLS in the literature, such assumptions
are considered inappropriate for the data at hand. Instead, the data is categorised into
three levels of trustworthiness - low, medium and high - estimating (13) using a binary
probit model. Groupings of trustworthiness, described as low-, medium- and high-types, are
asymmetric in nature: a negative coefficient for low-type trustworthiness is not equal and
opposite for high-type, owing to few return proportions being above two-thirds of amount
received. In general, participants preserved some self-interest. Given how few participants
were categorised as high trustworthiness, the results are not reported due to lack of the
subset’s sample size.
6. Results
Mixed and fixed-effect specifications controlling for individual heterogeneity give consis-
tent estimates across variables but increase coefficient magnitude implying unobservables
add a downward bias. The more appropriate mixed-effect coefficients are discussed here-
after but conclusions are robust to specification changes. The effectiveness of religiosity in
conditioning individual trust, individual trustworthiness and two-way cooperation in trust
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Figure 4: (1) Proposer Amount Sent (Trust), (2) Raw Responder Proportion Returned (Trustworthiness),
(3) categories from (2). Colour in print but possible reproduction in greyscale
networks is first tested examining Uni-Dimensional Model results. However, religiosity itself
contains both believing and belonging channels. Thus, for robustness and better identifica-
tion of channel strength, Multi-Dimensional Model results are subsequently discussed.
6.1. Believing
Result 1. Highly religious individuals are more trusting even with anonymous partners.
Considering significant Proposer characteristics, high self-defined religiosity and general
religiosity increase trust even with anonymous partners (giving over £0.90 more on average)
confirming indiscriminate prosociality. Supporting Anderson et al. (2010), religious affilia-
tion is not significant; it is strength of religiosity, not merely affinity to a religious group,
which matters.
Table 4: Trust Ordered Probit with Proposer Religiosity
Proposer Rel
Pass Amount ∈ (£0, £6 ) (1) (2) (3)
Rel Affil 0.334
(0.424)
Self-Defined High Rel 0.931∗
(0.452)
High Gen Rel 0.912+
(0.508)
Controls Y Y Y
Round Dummies Y Y Y
N 1015 1015 1015
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by ID. Standard coefficients reported. Multilevel mixed-effects estimation
results reported. Random-effects also estimated and consistent (available upon request).Controls = {sex, crra}.
Comparison group to High Gen Rel = weakly religious and non-religious individuals by factor score.
Result 2. Religious individuals are more trustworthy even with anonymous partners.
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Considering Responder own characteristics, highly religious individuals are 19.3% (at
means) less likely to be categorised as low-type trustworthiness and more likely medium-
type.
6.2. Stereotyping
Result 3. Trust placed in partners depends on expected reciprocity which is conditioned
on revealed characteristics. Positive qualities stereotypical of prosociality foster trust, while
negative qualities restrict it.
Considering significant partner characteristics, religious individuals are granted more trust,
receiving £0.83 more on average compared to baseline anonymity. Environmentally friendly
partners receive smaller positive bonuses. Conversely, individuals trusted politically inclined
partners less, indicating negative stereotyping, and displayed machine aversion as expected
offering a computer partner less than a human one. Result 3 indicates partner character-
istics are used to condition trust beyond a consideration if this partner is in- or out-group.
Stereotyping on available, albeit limited information, is a smart approach: given Result 2,
if a Responder is religious, conditioning trust on increased expected reciprocity is a rational
strategy because religious individuals are indeed more trustworthy.
6.3. Group Belonging
Result 4. Religious individuals trust those belonging to religions more, especially when
matching their own. Across all individuals, more trust is placed in same college partners.
Belonging to the same network, either secular or religious, acts as a coordination device.
Considering interactions between own religiosity and partner rounds, is trust of reli-
gious partners driven by religious participants? The Uni-Dimensional Model captures in-
group favouritism with high general religiosity individuals sending more to religious partners
(+£1.90 to baseline) but yet more to those from the same religion (+£2.02, 34% of total
budget). Use of shared information coordinates trust, when both partners’ religiosity is
common knowledge £1.82 more is sent. Supporting the ‘club good’ (Iannaccone 1998) and
favouritism-discrimination explanations (Ruﬄe and Sosis 2006), religious adherents cooper-
ate most with in-group partners in a mutually-beneficial but exclusive network. Non-religious
individuals cannot use ‘same religious affiliation’ to condition trust so the previously pos-
itive coefficient captured religious participants’ behaviour. Crucially, the round coefficient
on just ‘religious partner’ remains positive, confirming even secular individuals use religion
to update expectations of reciprocity when risking trust in line with Result 3. Across all
individuals, compared to a maximum budget of £6, there is an economically significant
bonus to baseline given to same college (+£0.59) and same college same year (+£0.87).
This increased trust is magnified (+£1.09) when the shared college is common knowledge.
Sharing political ideology also engenders a positive but small bonus suggesting the denser
the secular network, the stronger the effect in promoting trust.
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Summarising Results and Predictions
Prediction 1
Believing
Higher religiosity individuals unconditionally display more trust and
trustworthiness (Results 1, 2)
Prediction 2
Stereotyping
Expectations of a partners’ characteristic gameplay conditions trust.
Populations typecast for following altruistic norms are more trusted
even by individuals outside this population (Result 3). Religious
stereotypes are fulfilled by accordant trustworthiness so conditioning
trust on partner characteristics is a rational response (Result 2)
Prediction 3
Belonging
Same group partners conform more with group norms and divorce ac-
tions further from self-interest. In-group effects from shared religion
are unrivalled in strength by shared secular values but the dense net-
work provided by collegiate affiliation has substantial scope to mimic
in-group favouritism (Results 4, 5)
Prediction 4
Priming
No significant effect of priming. The instrument did not successfully
imbue exogenous religious salience (Result 6) In reality, the cultural
nature of religion renders it always endogenous.
Result 5. Fewer individuals are low-type trustworthiness when playing against religious or
same college partners. With no expectation of reciprocity in being trustworthy, behaviour
towards same network individuals rests on group norm-adherence or pure prosociality in
absence of investment motives.
Low-type trustworthiness is less likely to be displayed with religious and collegiate part-
ners (-3.4% and -4.4% at means, respectively) but more likely with politically inclined part-
ners (+7.2%).
6.4. Priming
Result 6. Priming salience of religious thought has no significant effect on trust.
Even when disaggregating by individual religiosity or round, priming has no effect com-
pared to the control group or to pre-prime behaviour, plausibly attributable to the subtle
instrument or decision-fatigue. Choi and Fisher (2012) reach a similar null conclusion.
7. Robustness: Multi-Dimensional Results
For robustness, rounds are interacted with measures of religiosity across the factor mod-
els. For Proposer characteristics, the effects of belonging and believing broadly agree with
the general factor model but coefficients are larger in magnitude. For Responder charac-
teristics, the coefficient on the religious round remains significant but falls, indicating some
of the previous effect was driven by religious individuals. This is confirmed since high gen-
eral religiosity individuals are 25% less likely to be low-type trustworthiness with religious
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partners than anonymous ones, a substantially larger coefficient in absolute terms and eco-
nomically more significant compared to other individuals in the same round (3.2%). Beyond
a robustness check, divorcing the two channels of religion provides a few notable results.
Stronger belonging and believing in religious individuals increases trust and trustwor-
thiness in all but especially religious partners. The Multi-Dimensional Model shows high
belonging and high believing2 individuals are significantly more trusting under baseline
anonymity, giving £1.14 and £0.98 more on average. High believers and belongers are more
trustworthy than generally religious individuals. They are less likely to be categorised as
low-type trustworthiness and more likely medium-type with all partners compared to base-
line and compared to generally religious individuals. Across both channels, most trust is
imbued and returned with the same and common knowledge religious partners, indicating
in-group affiliation is still most powerful.
Notably, a strong sense of religious belonging also supports secular trust networks where
general religiosity or high belief does not. High belonging individuals give significantly more
when matched with same college and environmentally friendly partners when informed of the
shared characteristic. High belongers are also more trustworthy being 19.8% more likely to
display medium-type trustworthiness when playing against collegiate partners compared to
the baseline round. This reveals a previously undocumented finding of belonging spillovers
for religious individuals in strengthening their secular affiliations.
8. Discussion
This paper implements a carefully considered experimental design including monetary
incentives, protection of anonymity and distraction from religion as the test subject, which all
minimise incentives to distort laboratory decisions away from true preferences. Additionally,
the design adds a new methodological contribution to the literature in testing the conditional
responses of Responders’ trustworthiness with revealed Proposer characteristics in the final
stage. This involves no expected reciprocity so yields pure prosociality with more returned
to both in- or out-group partners. Moreover, caution is applied in what assumptions can
be made for the statistical techniques applied. In lieu of existing literature methods, this
study uses oblique factor rotation and a more appropriate method of multilevel mixed-effects
ordered probit estimation treating trust as a latent variable and accommodating for multiple
sources of unobserved heterogeneity. Such care attempts to improve the internal validity of
the study.
What cannot be guaranteed is external validity which hinges on two remaining issues.
One limitation is that, as Henrich et al. (2010) criticise, the sample is drawn from a society
of Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich and Democratic or ‘WEIRD’ individuals whose
behaviours are not necessarily extendable cross-culturally. Despite having a representative
range of religions recruited from a large online pool, there was insufficient diversity in the
sample for informative results about behavioural differences across religions. Utilisation of
an online platform, such as Amazon MTurk, is a viable extension to this study, mitigating
2A ’high’ score allocation is given based on top 25th percentile of factor scores.
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sample size and specificity concerns. A second limitation is the consideration of uncon-
nected individuals which as a result obscures the social contexts of religion (Cheadle and
Schwadel 2012). Agents are more likely to conform to norms when embedded in dense famil-
iar networks (Cornwall 1987) rather than with in-group but faceless partners in a laboratory.
Consequently, an experimental setting with anonymous strangers will understate coopera-
tive effects of individuals in the same religious network. Field experiments or empirical
studies have more predictive power for religious behaviours in a transparent signalling envi-
ronment (e.g. a congregation) described better by a repeated game incorporating dynamic
reputational concerns.
Finally, does the trust game measure trust? Sequential nodes introduce strategic de-
pendency of the first mover’s decision. Payment conditioned on expected reciprocity is
a trust investment, but a present when motivated by altruism or inequity-aversion. Ex-
perimental evidence linking higher payment to the possibility of repayment (Gneezy et al.
2000, Bru¨lhart and Usunier 2010) does identify trust as the dominant determinant but the
separation of trust, prosociality and altruism is never absolute. Despite these limitations,
this experiment is a novel inquiry into how religion affects behaviour in dyadic one-shot
interactions, corroborating the finding that religiosity does promote cooperation.
9. Conclusion
This paper comprehensively identifies mechanisms by which religion, as one group affilia-
tion, affects strategic interactions. As suggested by panellists at the IEA Roundtable (2017),
it incorporates broader conceptions of religion’s believing versus belonging capacity in sup-
port of cooperative equilibria through formal adherence to creeds and to group norms. The
fundamental result is that religion does promote trust networks through stereotypical beliefs
reinforced by accordant strategies. Religious individuals are significantly more trusting and
trustworthy across the board. On expectation of this stereotypical behaviour, religious part-
ners are rewarded with greater interpersonal trust from all individuals - a Pareto-improving
coordination. The Golden Rule, present in all major religions (Batson et al. 1993), enforces
a law of reciprocity, even for secular individuals, to ‘treat your partner as yourself’. Sig-
nalling intentions of trustworthiness by making costly yet credible commitment to religion
ensures experimental gains and insures against defecting behaviour from other players. As
hypothesised, religion makes cooperation collectively a winning strategy.
In contrast to Hoffman’s (2013) reported lack of significant, robust effects, this study
finds religion highly consequential for trust. Disaggregated rounds revealing the interacting
contribution of one’s own and partner religiosity underpin this positive result by virtue
of methodology. A conclusion consistent with the literature is one of collective religious
consequence; religious effects operate most strongly within the religious group. According to
in-group favouritism versus out-group discrimination, over-revelation of generous behaviours
leaves religious networks vulnerable to exploitation. Religiosity is a strong and pervasive
predictor of gameplay between strangers, but is not unique in its provision of trust. These
results add to the literature in demonstrating experimentally that secular group affiliation
can provide the same benefits if the sense of belonging is sufficiently strong. Collegiate
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affiliation is a substitutable coordination device but less dense networks formed on shared
political or environmental views are insufficient common ground. These results confirm
the supposition that secular group affiliation can equally but less intensely support other-
regarding and trusting behaviours.
Whilst religion’s effect on strategic interaction remains the primary focus of this paper,
a final comment can be made on cooperation in diverse societies. Critically, more trust is
imbued to those expected to return the favour. It is ascription to shared values which binds
individuals together and religion is only one such coordination device. This paper demon-
strates beliefs about stereotypical behaviour conditioned on revealed information are a key
determinant of strategic interactions. In uncertain societal interactions, cooperation risks
exploitation in the face of dominant self-interest. The ancient Roman formula do ut des (“I
give that you might give”) originally records reciprocity of exchange between human being
and deity but suitably this expression of homo-religicus extends to homo-economicus. Even
for those whose lives are not ruled by religion, the strategic rules which religion teaches its
followers to play are a marker for cooperation, disseminating trust to society as a whole.
Dataset [dataset] Kirk, H., 2019. “Religion and Group Affiliation Data from Trust Game”,
Mendeley Data, V1, doi: 10.17632/4g64x8s27f.1
References
[1] Anderson, T. W. [1963], ‘Asymptotic theory for principal component analysis’, The Annals of Mathe-
matical Statistics 34(1), 122–148.
[2] Arrow, K. J. [1972], ‘Gifts and exchanges’, Philosophy & Public Affairs pp. 343–362.
[3] Azzi, C. and Ehrenberg, R. [1975], ‘Household allocation of time and church attendance’, Journal of
Political Economy 83(1), 27–56.
[4] Balliet, D. and Van Lange, P. A. [2013], ‘Trust, punishment, and cooperation across 18 societies: A
meta-analysis’, Perspectives on Psychological Science 8(4), 363–379.
[5] Barro, R. J. and McCleary, R. [2003], ‘Religion and economic growth across countries.’, American
Sociological Review 68(5), 760–781.
[6] Becker, P. E. and Dhingra, P. H. [2001], ‘Religious involvement and volunteering: Implications for civil
society’, Sociology of Religion 62(3), 315–335.
[7] Benjamin, D. J., Choi, J. J. and Fisher, G. W. [2010], Religious identity and economic behavior,
Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
[8] Berg, J., Dickhaut, J. and McCabe, K. [1995], ‘Trust, reciprocity, and social history’, Games and
economic behavior 10(1), 122–142.
[9] Binmore, K. and Dasgupta, P. [1986], Economic Organizations as Games, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
[10] Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. [2002], ‘Behavioural science: homo reciprocans’, Nature 415(6868), 125–128.
[11] Bru¨lhart, M. and Usunier, J.-C. [2012], ‘Does the trust game measure trust?’, Economics Letters
115(1), 20–23.
[12] Cattell, R. B. [1966], ‘The scree test for the number of factors’, Multivariate behavioral research
1(2), 245–276.
[13] Cheadle, J. E. and Schwadel, P. [2012], ‘The ‘friendship dynamics of religion’ or the ‘religious dynamics
of friendship’? A social network analysis of adolescents who attend small schools’, Social science
research 41(5), 1198–1212.
[14] Cornwall, M. [1989], ‘The determinants of religious behavior: A theoretical model and empirical test’,
Social forces 68(2), 572–592.
21
[15] Croson, R. and Buchan, N. [1999], ‘Gender and culture: International experimental evidence from trust
games’, The American Economic Review 89(2), 386–391.
[16] Darwin, C. [1871], The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, John Murray, London.
[17] Dasgupta, P. [2000], Economic progress and the idea of social capital, in P. Dasgupta and I. Serageldin,
eds, ‘Social capital: A multifaceted perspective’, World Bank, Washington, DC, pp. 325–424.
[18] Dasgupta, P. [2011], ‘A matter of trust: Social capital and economic development’, Annual Bank
Conference on Development Economics (ABCDE) - Global 2010: Lessons from East Asia and the
Global Financial Crisis pp. 119–155.
[19] Durkheim, E. [1915], The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, G. Allen & Urwin, London.
[20] Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K. M. [2003], Theories of fairness and reciprocity-evidence and economic ap-
plications, in L. P. H. Mathias Dewatripont and S. J. Turnovsky, eds, ‘Advances in Economics and
Econometrics, Vol. 1. Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society’, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, chapter 6.
[21] Fershtman, C., Gneezy, U. and Verboven, F. [2005], ‘Discrimination and nepotism: The efficiency of
the anonymity rule’, The Journal of Legal Studies 34(2), 371–396.
[22] Fischbacher, U., Ga¨chter, S. and Fehr, E. [2001], ‘Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from
a public goods experiment’, Economics letters 71(3), 397–404.
[23] Freeman, R. B. [1985], ‘Who escapes? The relation of church-going and other background factors to
the socio-economic performance of black male youths from inner-city poverty tracts’, NBER Working
Paper (W1656).
[24] Fruehwirth, J. C., Iyer, S. and Zhang, A. [2018], ‘Religion and depression in adolescence’, The Journal
for Political Economics .
[25] Gagnon, J. [2014], ‘With God We Trust: Religion, trust and cooperation in large-scale societies’,
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics (CWPE1406).
[26] Gneezy, U., Gu¨th, W. and Verboven, F. [2000], ‘Presents or investments? An experimental analysis’,
Journal of Economic Psychology 21(5), 481–493.
[27] Harsanyi, J. C. [1967], ‘Games with incomplete information played by ”Bayesian” players, I–III Part
I. The basic model’, Management Science 14(3), 159–182.
[28] Henrich, J., Ensminger, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cardenas, J. C.,
Gurven, M., Gwako, E., Henrich, N. et al. [2010], ‘Markets, religion, community size, and the evolution
of fairness and punishment’, Science 327, 1480–1484.
[29] Henrich, J., Heine, S. J. and Norenzayan, A. [2010], ‘Most people are not WEIRD’, Nature
466(7302), 29.
[30] Hoffman, E., McCabe, K. and Smith, V. L. [1996], ‘Social distance and other-regarding behavior in
dictator games’, The American Economic Review 86(3), 653–660.
[31] Hoffmann, R. [2013], ‘The experimental economics of religion’, Journal of Economic Surveys 27(5), 813–
845.
[32] Holt, C. A. and Laury, S. [n.d.], ‘Risk aversion and incentive effects’, American Economic Review
92(5), 1644–1655.
[33] Iannaccone, L. [1998], ‘Introduction to the economics of religion’, Journal of Economic Literature
36(3), 1465–1495.
[34] Iannaccone, L., Dasgupta, P., Maxwell, D. and McCleary, R. [2017], How Has Religion Shaped the
World?, in ‘International Economic Association Conference on The Economics of Religion’.
[35] Iyer, S. [2016], ‘The new economics of religion’, Journal of Economic Literature 54(2), 395–441.
[36] Kimbrough, E. O. and Vostroknutov, A. [2016], ‘Norms make preferences social’, Journal of the Euro-
pean Economic Association 14(3), 608–638.
[37] Knack, S. and Keefer, P. [1997], ‘Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-country inves-
tigation’, The Quarterly journal of Economics 112(4), 1251–1288.
[38] Krupka, E. L. and Weber, R. A. [2013], ‘Identifying social norms using coordination games: Why does
dictator game sharing vary?’, Journal of the European Economic Association 11(3), 495–524.
[39] Levy, G. and Razin, R. [2012], ‘Religious beliefs, religious participation, and cooperation’, American
22
Economic Journal 4(3), 121–151.
[40] Liu, E. M., Meng, J. and Wang, J. T.-y. [2014], ‘Confucianism and preferences: Evidence from lab
experiments in taiwan and china’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 104, 106–122.
[41] Miller, A. S. and Stark, R. [2002], ‘Gender and religiousness: Can socialization explanations be saved?’,
American Journal of Sociology 107(6), 1399–1423.
[42] Moeltner, K., Murphy, J., Stranlund, J. and Velez, M. [2008], Processing data from social dilemma
experiments: A Bayesian comparison of parametric estimators, university of nevada, reno, Technical
report, Joint Economics Working Paper Series.
[43] Norenzayan, A. [2013], Big gods: How religion transformed cooperation and conflict, Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
[44] Orbell, J., Goldman, M., Mulford, M. and Dawes, R. [1992], ‘Religion, context, and constraint toward
strangers’, Rationality and Society 4(3), 291–307.
[45] Ostrom, E. [2000], ‘Collective action and the evolution of social norms’, Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives 14(3), 137–158.
[46] Porta, R. L., Lopez-De-Silane, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. [1996], ‘Trust in large organizations’,
NBER Working Paper (5864).
[47] Putnam, R. D. [1993], ‘The prosperous community’, The American Prospect 4(13), 35–42.
[48] Rabin, M. [1993], ‘Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics’, The American economic
review pp. 1281–1302.
[49] Rubin, J. and Karaja, E. [2017], ‘The cultural transmission of trust norms: Evidence from a lab in the
field on a natural experiment’, Working Paper .
[50] Ruﬄe, B. J. and Sosis, R. [2006], ‘Cooperation and the in-group-out-group bias: A field test on israeli
kibbutz members and city residents’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 60(2), 147–163.
[51] Scobie, G. [1975], Psychology of Religion, B. T. Batsford., London.
[52] Selten, R. [1967], Die strategiemethode zur erforschung des eingeschra¨nkt rationalen verhaltens im
rahmen eines oligopolexperiments, in H. Sauerman, ed., ‘Beitra¨ge zur Experimentellen Wirtschafts-
forschung’, JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tu¨bingen.
[53] Shariff, A. F. and Norenzayan, A. [2007], ‘God is watching you: Priming God concepts increases
prosocial behavior in an anonymous economic game’, Psychological Science 18(9), 803–809.
[54] Smith, A. [1776], The Wealth of Nations, Vol. 1, Methuen & Co, London.
[55] Sosis, R. and Ruﬄe, B. J. [2003], ‘Religious ritual and cooperation: Testing for a relationship on israeli
religious and secular kibbutzim’, Current Anthropology 44(5), 713–722.
[56] Srull, T. K. and Wyer, R. S. [1979], ‘The role of category accessibility in the interpretation of in-
formation about persons: Some determinants and implications.’, Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 37(10), 1660.
[57] Tan, J. H. [2006], ‘Religion and social preferences: An experimental study’, Economics Letters
90(1), 60–67.
[58] Tan, J. H. and Vogel, C. [2008], ‘Religion and trust: An experimental study’, Journal of Economic
Psychology 29(6), 832–848.
[59] Thurstone, L. L. [1947], Multiple Factor Analysis., University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
[60] Wang, R. Y. and Ng, C. N. [n.d.], ‘Can centralized sanctioning promote trust in social dilemmas? A
two-level trust game with incomplete information’, PloS ONE 10(4), e0124513.
[61] Weber, M. [1958], The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism, Charles Scribners Sons, New
York.
[62] Welch, K. W. [1981], ‘An interpersonal influence model of traditional religious commitment’, The
Sociological Quarterly 22(1), 81–92.
23
Table 5: Trust Ordered Probit with Partner Rounds and Interactions of Proposer Religiosity. Full version
provided for reviewers but condensed version intended for publication
Rounds General Rel Belonging Believing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Pass Amount ∈ (£0, £6 ) Pooled ME FE Pooled ME Pooled ME Pooled ME
High Gen Rel 0.427+ 0.912+ 0.533∗ 1.110∗
(0.233) (0.508) (0.251) (0.566)
High Belong 0.569∗ 1.139∗
(0.245) (0.529)
High Belief 0.468+ 0.975+
Baseline Round: Anon (0.253) (0.562)
Env Friendly (2) 0.227∗∗ 0.434∗∗ 0.460∗∗ 0.302∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗ 0.528∗∗ 0.291∗∗ 0.553∗∗
(0.0796) (0.143) (0.151) (0.0966) (0.171) (0.0971) (0.170) (0.0956) (0.169)
Rel (3) 0.435∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗ 0.878∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗∗
(0.0933) (0.149) (0.158) (0.119) (0.200) (0.119) (0.199) (0.119) (0.200)
Same Coll (4) 0.297∗∗ 0.593∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.322∗ 0.649∗∗ 0.313∗ 0.629∗∗ 0.309∗ 0.602∗∗
(0.0971) (0.166) (0.175) (0.126) (0.222) (0.127) (0.220) (0.126) (0.220)
Same Rel (5) 0.204∗ 0.399∗ 0.424∗ 0.134 0.251 0.143 0.267 0.117 0.216
(0.0851) (0.159) (0.168) (0.0915) (0.171) (0.0921) (0.170) (0.0915) (0.171)
Pol Inclined (6) -0.155∗ -0.304∗ -0.321∗ -0.120 -0.249 -0.136 -0.278 -0.144 -0.299+
(0.0768) (0.138) (0.146) (0.0927) (0.172) (0.0933) (0.170) (0.0928) (0.172)
Same Coll & Yr (7) 0.434∗∗∗ 0.871∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗ 0.933∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.180) (0.191) (0.142) (0.241) (0.143) (0.240) (0.141) (0.238)
Rel & Same Coll (8) 0.451∗∗∗ 0.870∗∗∗ 0.925∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗ 0.874∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗ 0.836∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.179) (0.190) (0.145) (0.242) (0.143) (0.237) (0.144) (0.240)
Same Pol Ideology (9) 0.213∗ 0.404∗ 0.428∗ 0.313∗∗ 0.596∗∗ 0.284∗ 0.531∗∗ 0.298∗∗ 0.565∗∗
(0.0912) (0.163) (0.172) (0.114) (0.201) (0.113) (0.197) (0.114) (0.202)
Matched Env Friendly (10) 0.234∗ 0.444∗ 0.469∗ 0.295∗ 0.574∗∗ 0.265∗ 0.509∗ 0.297∗ 0.572∗
(0.0962) (0.180) (0.190) (0.117) (0.220) (0.115) (0.216) (0.118) (0.223)
Matched Rel (11) 0.0533 0.115 0.123 -0.0436 -0.0804 -0.0348 -0.0595 -0.0836 -0.167
(0.0852) (0.162) (0.171) (0.103) (0.199) (0.102) (0.194) (0.101) (0.196)
Matched Coll (12) 0.544∗∗∗ 1.087∗∗∗ 1.156∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗ 1.239∗∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗ 1.196∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗ 1.198∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.184) (0.195) (0.149) (0.252) (0.147) (0.246) (0.148) (0.248)
Machine (13) -0.391∗∗ -0.694∗∗ -0.732∗∗ -0.296∗ -0.525+ -0.302∗ -0.533+ -0.328∗ -0.595∗
(0.120) (0.222) (0.23) (0.147) (0.279) (0.146) (0.277) (0.144) (0.274)
(3) * High Gen Rel 0.444+ 1.036+
(0.255) (0.576)
(5) * High Gen Rel 0.823∗∗ 1.769∗∗
(0.273) (0.595)
(8) * High Gen Rel 0.522+ 1.156+
(0.270) (0.595)
(11) * High Gen Rel 0.911∗∗∗ 1.900∗∗
(0.251) (0.567)
(3) * High Belong 0.514∗ 1.127∗
(0.247) (0.547)
(4) * High Belong 0.511∗ 1.032+
(0.258) (0.552)
(5) * High Belong 0.829∗∗ 1.713∗∗
(0.269) (0.571)
(8) * High Belong 0.641∗ 1.318∗
(0.276) (0.579)
(10) * High Belong 0.462+ 0.903+
(0.269) (0.548)
(11) * High Belong 0.916∗∗∗ 1.840∗∗∗
(0.245) (0.549)
(3) * High Belief 0.478+ 1.112+
(0.254) (0.579)
(5) * High Belief 0.823∗∗ 1.774∗∗
(0.274) (0.601)
(8) * High Belief 0.513+ 1.174+
(0.276) (0.609)
(11) * High Belief 1.001∗∗∗ 2.110∗∗∗
(0.245) (0.564)
Controls Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 1015 1015 1015 1015 1015 1015 1015 1015 1015
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by ID. Standard coefficients reported. Pooled and multilevel mixed-effects (ME) estimation
results reported. All models run with full set of interactions but only significant coefficients displayed. Controls = {sex, crra}.
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Table 6: Trustworthiness Binary Probit with Partner Rounds and Interactions of Responder Religiosity.
Full version provided for reviewers but condensed version intended for publication
Rounds General Rel Belonging Believing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pr(Return Proportion) Low Med Low Med Low Med Low Med
High Gen Rel -0.193* 0.172** -0.209* 0.147*
(0.0791) (0.0639) (0.0865) (0.0747)
High Belong -0.261** 0.203**
(0.0825) (0.0718)
High Belief -0.259** 0.200**
(0.0817) (0.0702)
Male 0.164* -0.190** 0.165* -0.191** 0.177* -0.202** 0.164* -0.191**
(0.0727) (0.0675) (0.0729) (0.0676) (0.0719) (0.0672) (0.0723) (0.0674)
Baseline Round: Anon
Rel (2) -0.0341* 0.0219 -0.0315* 0.0152 -0.0432* 0.0269 -0.0430* 0.0272
(0.0164) (0.0189) (0.0133) (0.0193) (0.0191) (0.0239) (0.0190) (0.0240)
Coll (3) -0.0438+ -0.0240 -0.0634* -0.0288 -0.0612* -0.0321 -0.0661* -0.0106
(0.0228) (0.0288) (0.0288) (0.0371) (0.0289) (0.0376) (0.0271) (0.0355)
Env Friendly (4) 0.000672 -0.0267 -0.0171 -0.0303 -0.0144 -0.0337 -0.0253 -0.0226
(0.0188) (0.0233) (0.0180) (0.0260) (0.0180) (0.0262) (0.0198) (0.0279)
Pol Inclined (5) 0.0723** -0.0703** 0.0857** -0.0923** 0.0743* -0.0801** 0.0718* -0.0777*
(0.0252) (0.0265) (0.0315) (0.0316) (0.0300) (0.0298) (0.0310) (0.0310)
High Gen Rel * (2) -0.218** 0.170*
(0.0809) (0.0678)
High Gen Rel * (3) -0.137 0.164*
(0.0885) (0.0742)
High Gen Rel * (4) -0.147+ 0.160*
(0.0873) (0.0742)
High Gen Rel * (5) -0.254** 0.220**
(0.0817) (0.0715)
High Belong * (2) -0.229** 0.187**
(0.0806) (0.0705)
High Belong * (3) -0.199* 0.230**
(0.0852) (0.0728)
High Belong * (4) -0.208* 0.225**
(0.0845) (0.0728)
High Belong * (5) -0.262*** 0.232***
(0.0796) (0.0691)
High Belief * (2) -0.228** 0.182**
(0.0805) (0.0692)
High Belief * (3) -0.178* 0.155*
(0.0855) (0.0745)
High Belief * (4) -0.168* 0.185**
(0.0828) (0.0695)
High Belief * (5) -0.252** 0.221**
(0.0804) (0.0696)
N 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400 2400
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by ID.
Marginal effects dy/dx reported at means. Multilevel mixed-effects estimation results reported.
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Appendix A. Experimental Instructions
These experimental instructions were adapted from Tan and Vogel (2008) and printed for
all participants.
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
You are participating in an experiment on decision-making. Please read these instructions
before you begin. Once you feel you understand the instructions please start the computer
task. You will be asked to complete an understanding test of the task. If there are any
problems, please ask the experimenter.
Please note that communication with other participants is not allowed in this experiment.
This experiment is taking place at two locations in the university who have received the
same instructions and computer task as you. You can be matched with partners across
locations.
There are four sections to this experiment:
• Section 1: You will play games with a partner. This section has two stages: Stage 1,
Stage 2. Each stage will contain a number of choices.
• Section 2: You will complete a cognitive task then play a game with a partner. This
section contains a number of choices.
• Section 3: You will play a game alone. This section has one stage.
• Section 4: You will complete some survey questions.
SECTION 1 INSTRUCTIONS
In each round, you have to make decisions about how much money to pass to a partner.
The amount you earn depends on the decision/s you and/or your partner make in that round.
In each task, there are two participants, participant A (A) and participant B (B). A starts
with £6, and B with £0. In this experiment, you will play the roles of both A and B.
In some rounds, you will receive information about your partner. This information, however,
will not be about your partner’s choices, only their characteristics.
As A, you must decide how many pounds to pass– none, some, or all – to B. Each pound
that you pass to B will be doubled.
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As B, you have to decide, based on number of pounds A might pass to you, how many
pounds – none, some, or all – to pass back to A.
A’s final number of pounds depends on the number on pounds A keeps plus the number of
pounds B returns to you.
B’s final pounds depend on the pounds A passes to B multiplied by 2, plus the number of
pounds of B keeps after passing – none, some or all – back to A.
Read the following example to check you understand. Suppose A passes £3 to B
and keeps the remaining £3. B receives (3x2 =) £6. From these £6, B returns £2 and keeps
remaining £4.
Pounds at end of task
A £3 + £2 = £5
B £4
Decisions as Participant B and Participant A
You will first play the role of B in Stage 1, and will play the role of A second in Stage 2. In
each round, the computer will match you with a new partner. In some rounds you will be
given some information. Each piece of information is relevant to your NEW partners and is
not giving additional information on one partner.
As B, you decide a strategy on how many pounds to pass to A for each possible number of
pounds A might pass to you. In some rounds, A may be provided with a piece of informa-
tion about you, for example your IQ level. Additionally, in some rounds, you will be given
information about the characteristics of your A partner. For example, “your partner was
born in the same country as you.”
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As A, you decide how many pounds to pass to B out of your initial £6. In some rounds,
you will be given information about B. The computer will match you with an A player who
corresponds to the information that is provided in that round. For example, if you are told
“B has an IQ of 150”, the computer will pair you with any B player with an IQ of 150.
Payments
You are guaranteed a fixed show-up fee of £4. Your final payment will be based on one
randomly chosen A decision and the decision of the corresponding B player you were paired
with. For example, suppose in round 2 of your A decisions, you keep £4 and get returned
£2. The computer will randomly determine this ‘selected round’. You will not know this
until the end of the experiment when you collect your payments.
For example, if round 2 of you A decisions is chosen as the ‘selected round’, you will receive
£6 in variable payment to add to your £4 show-up fee, creating a total take-home payment
of £10.
SECTION 2 INSTRUCTIONS
You will be provided with a list to words to unscramble into a sentence as quickly as you can.
In this task, you will receive 5 sets of 5 words. For each of set of words, please form a
sentence or phrase using ONLY 4 TERMS.
Example:
Words Unscrambled Sentence
Disciplined Man Flower The Was The Man Was Disciplined
Eggs The Police Contains Recipe The Recipe Contains Eggs
You will then be asked to play as A once more and the computer will match you with B
players.
SECTION 3 INSTRUCTIONS
You will be provided with the above options and asked to select the preferred payoff options
between Option A and Option B.
To understand the options available to you, take the first row in the table and consider a
10-sided dice.
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Under Option A, you will receive: £2 if a 1 is rolled, and £1.60 if any number between 2
and 10 is rolled
Under Option B, you will receive: - £3.85 if a 1 is rolled, and £0.10 if any number between
2 and 10 is rolled.
Please go through each row deciding which option is preferred on computer task provided.
SECTION 4 INSTRUCTIONS
Please complete the provided survey question.
END OF INSTRUCTIONS
Please feel free to raise your hand for help if you feel the need, now or anytime during the
experiment, for clarification. Many thanks for your participation, and good luck!
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